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CASE SUMMARIES
MISSOURI
State ex rel. Laidlaw Waste Sys. v.
City of Kansas City, 1993 WL 69482
(Mo.App. W.D.)
Laidlaw Waste Systems, Inc. ("Laidlaw")
applied for a landfill use permit with the
Kansas City Board of Zoning Administration
("BZA"). The BZA denied Laidlaw's applica-
tion on May 24, 1991 and Laidlaw, follow-
ing the BZA's rules, applied for a rehearing
within thirty days on June 21, 1991. The
BZA granted Laidlaw a rehearing on July 9.
1991 and again denied BZA a permit on
December 7, 1991. Laidlaw then appealed
to the Clay County Circuit Court which
denied the appeal as untimely.
The Missouri Western District Court of
Appeals affirmed the circuit court. The Court
of Appeals held that the statutory provision
which allowed for the creation of the BZA
required that all appeals be filed with the
circuit court within thirty days of the BZA's
final decision. Laidlaw filed for appeal more
than six months after the BZA's final deci-
sion in May 1991, and thus was untimely.
The court further held that the BZA only
has authority over a decision within the thirty
period. Assuming without deciding that zon-
ing boards may hold rehearings, the court
held all BZA decisions to be final unless a
rehearing is applied for and granted within
the thirty day period. The BZA did not grant
Laidlaw a rehearing until fifteen days after
the thirty day period expired, thereby losing
its jurisdiction.
The court's decision effectively nullified
the BZA's rule provision allowing the BZA
up to thirty days to grant or deny the rehear-
ing after the application for a rehearing.
-Tom Ray
Hulshof v. Noranda Aluminum, Inc.,
835 S.W. 2d 411 (Mo.App. 1992)
Robert and Stella Hulshof brought suit
against Noranda Aluminum, Inc. ("Noranda"),
Associated Electric Cooperative, Inc. ("AECI")
and the City of New Madrid, Missouri, seek-
ing damages for the discharge of polluted
drainage waters into a public drainage ditch
which overflowed onto their farmland. Stella
Hulshof sought damages for the decrease in
fair market value of her farmland. Both
plaintiffs additionally sued for damages for
the destruction of crops as well as actual and
punitive damages for the impairment of their
"right to use and enjoy their farmland." They
also sought a permanent injunction against
Noranda and AECI to prevent future over-
flow.
Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their ac-
tions against AECI and New Madrid. The
trial court found in Noranda's favor on the
plaintiffs' claims for damages, but found for
plaintiffs on their request for a permanent
injunction. Plaintiffs appealed from the judg-
ment with respect to the damages while
defendant cross-appealed with respect to
the injunction.
Plaintiffs alleged that the trial court erred
in denying their motion for a new trial be-
cause the jury allegedly rendered a written
statement to the court which was inconsis-
tent with the verdict rendered in favor of
Noranda. The written statement proposed
that Noranda, in lieu of punitive damages,
expend funds to divert the polluted water
from the drainage ditch into the Mississippi
River. Noranda contended that the written
statement was "mere surplusage" rather than
part of the verdict and should be ignored.
Noranda additionally argued that plaintiffs
did not object in the trial court to the incon-
sistency between the general verdict and the
written statement and consequently, plain-
tiffs should not be allowed to raise the issue
on appeal.
The court agreed with Noranda that a
claim that the verdict is inconsistent must be
presented to the trial court before the jury is
dismissed and found plaintiffs' point on ap-
peal without merit.
Noranda's appeal alleged that the trial
court erred in permanently enjoining Noranda
from continuing to discharge polluted waters
into the public drainage ditch. This argument
was premised on Noranda's claim that the
jury verdict was against the weight of the
evidence. The appellate court found that
substantial evidence had been presented to
the trial court to support the permanent
injunction.
Noranda also argued that the trial court
erred in issuing the injunction because the
threat of substantial future harm was not
proven. To prove this, the plaintiffs had to
show not only anticipation, but rather an
actual threat of future harm. Plaintiffs also
had to show that Noranda's use of its prop-
erty was "unreasonable, unusual, or unnatu-
ral" and "substantially impair[ed] the right of
[plaintiffs] to peacefully enjoy [their] prop-
erty." (quoting Frank v. Environmental Sani-
tation Mgmt., 687 S.W. 2d 876, 880 (Mo.
banc 1985). The appellate court found that
the plaintiff had adequately proven that
Noranda used its property unreasonably and
unnaturally and such use would continue to
harm the property in the future.
Noranda also asserted that the trial court
issued the injunction in error because the jury
verdicts were rendered in Noranda's favor.
Noranda argued that res judicata precluded
the trial court from ordering the injunction.
The court noted that even if actual damages
for past acts have not been awarded, injunc-
tive relief directed to future actions may still
be granted. The court acknowledged that
injunctive relief is only appropriate where
the resulting injury is continuous and irrepa-
rable. The court found that the trial court
properly concluded that the continued op-
eration of Noranda's facilities would result in
recurrent harm. As a result, the court denied
Noranda's claim and also found res judicata
to be inapplicable.
Boatmen's Bank of Pulaski County
v. Wilson, 833 S.W.2d 879 (Mo.App.
1992)
Appellant mortgagors defaulted in the
payment of two notes payable to and held by
respondent bank. Respondent then fore-
closed on two deeds of trust securing the
33ME L PR I
Vol. 1 * No. 1 * Summer 1993
payment of those notes. Appellants then
asserted a counterclaim or offset for amount
of deficiency. Appellants contended that the
trustee - the chief executive officer of re-
spondent bank - committed a breach of
trust when he followed respondent bank's
general policy and ordered independent ap-
praisals of the property to be foreclosed;
when he ordered an environmental assess-
ment concerning potential environmental
hazards the appellants had created on one of
the tracts of property; or when he partici-
pated in respondent's decision not to bid on
the property that was found to be such an
environmental hazard.
Appellants also claimed that respondent
acted inequitably when it bid eighty percent
of the appraised value of property subject to
foreclosure. The Circuit Court of Pulaski
County, Missouri, found in favor of the
respondent bank on both counts. Appellant
mortgagors appealed in the Missouri Court
of Appeals for the Southern District, which
held that there was no impropriety in con-
duct of sales that would warrant relief re-
quested by appellant mortgagors.
The respondent bank obtained an inde-
pendent appraisal of the value of the prop-
erty prior to the foreclosure sale. One of the
two tracts was valued at $65,000, subject to
a disclaimer of consideration of environmen-
tal problems with the property. The bank
then halted the foreclosure proceeds and
ordered a preliminary environmental assess-
ment of the property in question. The assess-
ment revealed that the land had potentially
been impacted from boat manufacturing
activities and waste dumping. To determine
the degree of impact would cost between
fifty and eighty thousand additional dollars.
The assessor also concluded that the condi-
tion of the property could require "remedial
cleanup activities that could range in cost
from $100,000 to an excess of $1,000,000."
The respondent bank determined that it
would not bid on the tract in question at the
foreclosure sale. That tract sold to another
boat manufacturer for $2,500 at the sale.
The bank bought the second tract of prop-
erty for eighty percent of its appraised value,
a common practice of the bank. With regard
to the potentially contaminated property,
the appellate court found that the appellant
did not offer any evidence to minimize the
possibility of the existence of an environ-
mental hazard it he had created. The court
then found that the purchase of the property
at $2,500 was reasonable, if not high, con-
sidering the potential liability of the property.
The court also found that the tnstee, who
was also a director of the bank, breached no
duty in following normal bank policy.
FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT
East Prairie R-2 School Dist. v. U.S.
Gypsum Co., 813 F.Supp. 1396 (E.D.Mo.
1993).
East Prairie R-2 Schools sued manufac-
turers of asbestos products used in school
construction. The case was before the court
on a motion for partial summary judgment
filed by defendant W.R. Grace & Co.
("Grace"), which maintained it was not in the
asbestos business in 1957 and, therefore,
cannot be liable for the presence of the
substance in a high school built in that year.
In 1963, however, Grace "absorbed" Zonolite
Co., which had been an asbestos manufac-
turer at the time the East Prairie high school
was built. As part of the asset purchase
Grace executed an assumption of "all debts
and liabilities of Zonolite existing on the
Closing whether absolute, contingent or oth-
erwise." East Prairie Schools contended its
claims filed in 1990 constitute "contingent
liabilities."
The case presented the question of whether
an asset purchaser which assumed an asbes-
tos manufacturer's "contingent liabilities"
can be held liable in tort for the actions of its
predecessor when the cause of action did not
accrue until after the assets changed hands.
The district court ruled that the purchaser
cannot be held liable and granted partial
summary judgment based on an analysis of
applicable choice of laws rules.
After first determining that Grace was not
liable as a successor corporation under the
"mere continuation" or the "de facto merger"
theories of successor liability, the court turned
to Grace's assumption of Zonolite's liabili-
ties.
The alleged tort occurred in Missouri, but
the assumption agreement was executed in
New York and provided that it was to be
governed by New York law. The district
court ruled that Missouri law would apply to
determine if Grace was a successor corpora-
tion, but New York law would determine the
effect of the assumption agreement. The
court said this comported with Missouri's
contract choice of law rule that the law of the
place intended by the parties shall govern the
interpretation of a contract.
Given that New York law says a tort cause
of action does not accrue until an injury
occurs, an uninjured party cannot be consid-
ered a "contingent liability." "Granted that
'contingency' invokes uncertain events, the
uncertainty should be restricted to the suc-
cess of asserting an existing claim, rather
than expanding it to include the altogether
unpredictable event that an injury will oc-
cur." Partial summary judgment was proper
since Grace cannot be liable for the liabilities
of Zonolite in this matter, and since Grace
was not making the asbestos acoustical plas-
ter at the time the high school was built.
Board of Managers, Bottineau
County Water Resource Dist. v.
Bornhoft, 812 F.Supp. 1012 (D.N.D.
1993)
This is an action for declaratory and in-
junctive relief against the Corps of Engineers
("Corps") conceming the construction of
two projects designed to provide relief for
flooding problems in North Dakota. The
Plaintiff, Board of Managers ("Board") is the
goveming body of the Bottineau County
Water Resource District. Platte Valley Con-
struction was awarded the contract for the
construction of the two projects.
The Board applied to the Corps for a
§ 404 permit pursuant to the Clean Water
Act ("CWA") because of plans to discharge
dredged or fill materials in wetlands. While
this application was pending, work which did
not require the permit was started on the
projects.
After discovering that Platte Valley Con-
struction had deposited spoil material in a
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wetland on one of the projects, the Corps
issued a cease and desist" letter to the
Board, ordering the unauthorized work to be
discontinued and stating that the consider-
ation of the § 404 permit was suspended
until the dispute was resolved.
Two years after the cease and desist letter
was issued, the conflict had not been re-
solved. The Board brought this lawsuit, re-
questing the court to determine that the
Board was not responsible for the unautho-
rized discharge and to compel the Corps to
make a decision on the Board's § 404
application. The Corps filed a motion to
dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction,
taking the position that "a landowner may
not seek judicial review of agency action
pursuant to CWA until the agency assesses
civil penalties or brings its own enforcement
action."
The Board opposed the motion to dismiss
by:
1. filing a motion for summary judg-
ment, arguing that the unauthorized dis-
charge was a result of Platte Valley failing to
comply with § 404 of the CWA;
2. arguing that the letters ordering the
Board to "cease and desist" constitute final
agency action and are reviewable by this
court; and
3. arguing that the Corps' granting of
the permit after the filing of the motion for
summary judgment constitutes final agency
action and is reviewable by the court.
The Eighth Circuit followed the Fourth
and Seventh Circuits' determination that
Congress intended to preclude judicial re-
view of compliance orders issued under the
CWA prior to enforcement action or impo-
sition of penalties.
The court dismissed the action pursuant
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The
court specifically determined that the Corps
action of sending a cease and desist letter did
not constitute an enforcement action or an
assessment of any penalties and therefore is
not a final agency action which is reviewable
by the court.
- Brian S. Franciskato
May v. AC & S Inc., 812 F.Supp. 934
(E.D.Mo. 1993)
In 1983, four school districts on behalf of
all public school districts and private schools
in the United States brought an action to
recover the costs incurred to abate asbestos
contamination. Defendants are primary pro-
ducers and suppliers of asbestos construc-
tion and insulation products used in schools.
Plaintiffs opted out of the class action suit in
1988 and filed an action against defendants
on theories of strict liability, negligence,
implied warranty, express warranty, fraudu-
lent misrepresentation and civil conspiracy.
Plaintiffs sought to recover from defendants
the cost of abating the hazards posed by
materials present in plaintiffs' buildings which
contained asbestos.
Defendants requested summary judgment
on all of the claims on the theory that the
applicable statutes of limitations had ex-
pired. The court addressed only whether the
limitations periods had expired for all claims.
It found that the limitation periods did not bar
the claims and denied the defendants' mo-
tions for summary judgment.
Defendants alleged that the plaintiffs' suit
is barred by the applicable Missouri statute of
limitations. Plaintiffs argued that the plain-
tiffs' membership in the class action suit in
1983 tolled the applicable statutes of limita-
tion, and that even if the class action suit did
not toll the running of the statutes of limita-
tion, several issues of material fact preclude
the granting of summary judgment based
upon the expiration of the appropriate time
to file suit. The court found that plaintiffs'
membership in the earlier class action suit
did in fact toll the statute of limitations until
the time the plaintiffs opted out of the class.
Whether plaintiffs' claims are barred de-
pends upon the time at which the claims
accrued. Under Missouri law, a cause of
action accrues when the damage is sustained
and ascertainable. Defendants argued that
plaintiffs' claims accrued when they learned
about the potential dangers of asbestos and
that such information was made known tot
he public between 1979 and 1982. Further,
plaintiffs had their buildings inspected for
asbestos and consulted with experts during
that time. Plaintiffs argue that because their
action was for asbestos contamination, the
cause of action did not accrue until the
contamination occurred and plaintiffs ascer-
tained the risk of harm from such contamina-
tion.
As for the strict liability, negligence and
conspiracy claims, the court found the appli-
cable Missouri statute of limitations to be five
years from the accrual of the cause of action.
Plaintiffs stated that they could not ascertain
that their buildings were contaminated until
1983 because the plethora of information
available at the time did not recognize whether
and to what extent asbestos posed an unrea-
sonable contamination.
The court found that in the late 1970s and
early 1980s, the exact nature of the health
risks and level at which exposure became
dangerous was speculative. The court re-
fused to grant summary judgment because
the accrual times were disputed. The court
did note that if the tort claims arose on or
after January 16, 1978, then they were
timely filed. Any claims that arose before that
date were barred.
Whether plaintiffs' warranty deed claims.
were barred depended upon whether the
claims accrued prior to or after July 1, 1965.
Under Missouri law, any warranty claims
arising before July 1, 1965 are subject to a
five year limitation statute. Claims arising
after that date have a four year statute of
limitations. If the warranty extends to future
performance, then the limitations period is
five years. The date of delivery starts the
running of the statute. A breach of warranty
occurs when tender of delivery is made. If.
however, the product has a warranty for
future performance, the limitations period
begins from that date on which the defect
was or should have been discovered.
Because implied warranties do not war-
rant future performance of a product, the
court found that plaintiffs implied warrants
claims had expired at the latest in 1976. As
for the express warranty claims, plaintiffs
contended that representations made b,
defendants as to the quality of their asbestos-
containing products act as warranties foi
future performance in which case the limita
tions period begins when the defect wa
discovered. The court rejected this argu
ment, however, focusing on the fact tha
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warranties for future performance must
specify a particular period of time. Defen-
dants' representations did not contain a time
period. The court consequently granted sum-
mary judgment for defendants as to the
warranty claims.
The parties also disputed when the cause
of action for the fraud claim accrued. Mis-
souri law provides ten years for the discovery
of fraud. A fraud action must be commenced
within five years of discovery. Defendants
contended that due to information publicly
available, plaintiffs knew or should have
known by 1983 that the alleged fraud had
occurred. Since the last asbestos-containing
materials were installed in 1972, the fifteen
year limit on filing suit expired in 1987. The
court found however, that due to the tolling
of the plaintiffs' suit between 1983 and
1988, the claim was not barred. As a result,
the court refused to grant summary judg-
ment on the fraud claim.
Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Sonford Prod-
ucts Corp., 810 F.Supp. 1057 (D.Minn.
1993)
Industry Capital, Inc. loaned money to
Sonford Products Corporation some years
ago, taking a security interest in its assets,
including inventory and equipment. Industry
Financial Corporation (IFC) is the successor
to Industry Capital. Sonford manufactured
wood preservatives on land leased from
Ashland Oil, Inc. Sonford declared bank-
ruptcy in 1982. To facilitate a transfer of the
bankrupt's assets to another corporation,
IFC foreclosed its security interest and briefly
held title to the property. It then sold the
assets to Park Penta Corporation. IFC fi-
nanced the purchase and again took a secu-
rity interest in the assets. One year later, Park
Penta filed for bankruptcy. When no buyers
could be found, IFC abandoned its security
interest.
Ashland alleges that Sonford's operations
left the property contaminated with hazard-
ous waste and brought this action against
IFC and others for cleanup costs under
CERCLA and state law theories.' Ashland
claims IFC, as a one-time owner of the
Sonford assets, qualifies as an "owner or
operator" under 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2), or
as "arranger" under 42 U.S.C. § 9 607(aX3).
Ashland used three separate CERCLA
theories in attempting to attach liability to
IFC: that IFC held title to the assets and
therefore qualifies as an owner/operator;
that IFC "participated in the management"
of Sonford and Park Penta; and that IFC
"arranged for disposal or treatment... of haz-
ardous substances." The court rejected all
three theories.
A) Owner/operator. The court noted
that the CERCLA definition of "owner or
operator" is broad, but not unlimited. The
statute expressly provides a safe harbor for
any person who "without participating in ...
management ... holds indicia of ownership
primarily to protect his security interest." 42
U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A). The court looked to
the lender liability rule codified at 40 C.F.R.
§ 300.1100. The rule, promulgated by EPA
to eliminate the confusion over lender liabil-
ity and the scope of the safe harbor provi-
sion, defines "indicia of ownership" as title
acquired "incident to foreclosure and its
equivalents." 40 C.F.R. § 300.1100(a).
IFC's foreclosure on the collateral meant
it held title to Sonford's allegedly leaking
assets for three weeks, while it put together
the deal to transfer ownership to Park Penta.
The court held that such ownership falls
squarely within the safe harbor provisions for
secured parties.
B) Participant in Management.
Ashland maintained that IFC should be held
liable under the CERCLA provision which
removes the safe harbor protection from a
lender who actually participates in manage-
ment and operation of the facility. 42 U.S.C.§ 9601(20)(A). But, as IFC's involvement
with Sonford and Park Penta was restricted
to policing its security interest by reviewing
the debtors' finances, the court held it had
not participated in management. See, 40
C.F.R. § 300.1100(c)(2)(ii) (policing security
agreements does not constitute participation
in management). The court said that the
primary authority of the EPA in CERCLA
matters entitles its regulation to deference,
and therefore, the court would follow the rule
clarifying the scope of the lender safe harbor.
C) Arranger of Disposal or Treat-
ment. Ashland argued that as IFC arranged
the transfer of assets between Sonford and
Park Penta, it had "arranged" for the dis-
posal of allegedly hazardous materials and
was liable under 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3). The
court ruled that liability in such circumstances
can attach only when the "arranger" has
taken some affirmative action. The mere sale
of property is not sufficient to impose ar-
ranger liability on the seller.
Lundgren v. United States, 810 F.Supp.
256 (D.Minn. 1992)
Property owners filed suit under Federal
Tort Claims Act ("FTCA") alleging that the
Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA")
was negligent in failing to warn them of their
exposure to contaminated water. The prop-
erty owners lived near the Arrowhead Refin-
ery Superfund Site, where ground water was
contaminated. In 1987 the EPA sampled the
water well which supplied the properties of
the plaintiffs and found that it contained
elevated levels of tetrachloroethene, and the
presence of toluene, methylene chloride and
1, 1, 1-trichloroethane. Despite requests for
the results, however, the EPA did not reveal
them to the plaintiffs until 1989. At that time
the EPA also advised plaintiffs to ventilate
their home during heavy water use and to use
bottled water for drinking and cooking -
activities for which they had previously used
well water.
In February 1991 plaintiffs filed a stan-
dard Form 95 "Claim for Damage, Injury, or
Death" with the EPA for $540,000. Two
later supplements were sent authorizing le-
gal representation by Grant Merritt. In Octo-
ber 1991 the EPA sent a letter to Merritt
stating that there had not been a claim





submitted for purposes of FTCA because the
purported claim did not state a sum certain
amount for each claimant. The EPA also
refused to consider the claims of two minor
plaintiffs because there was inadequate proof
of authorized representation of them. Plain-
tiffs amended the claim in December 1991
by itemizing damages for each individual and
including an affidavit of legal representation
of the minors.
In March 1992 the EPA denied the
amended claim as untimely because the sum
certain was not stated for each individual
until two years after the claim accrued. Plain-
tiffs then filed the FTCA action. The United
States moved to dismiss for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction orfor summary judgment.
The district court held that the require-
ment that a sum certain be stated was met by
plaintiffs when they stated the sum to cover
the group of claimants and expressly identi-
fied all claimants. The district court also
found that the claim met the administrative
exhaustion requirements before the two
amendments to the claim were filed and,
hence, before the two year limitation period.
Therefore, the government's motion for sum-
mary judgment was denied.
Slagle v. Baldwin, 809 F.Supp. 704
(D.Minn. 1992)
Slagle, the owner of property in Cass
County, Minnesota, sought to develop his
property as residential property. The County
Zoning Board of Adjustment approved "fill
applications" for Slagle's development. Sub-
sequently, within four years, Slagle discharged
approximately 18,500 cubic yards of dredged
or fill material on 5.33 acres of wetland
within a cedar swamp. The United States
Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps") ordered
Slagle to stop performing work on the site
until an after-the-fact ("AFT) permit had
been filed and approved.
Slagle filed an application for an AFT
permit, seeking permission to retain the
filling work already completed. In addition,
he sought permission to (1) fill an additional
half acre of wetland; (2) dredge a new ditch
for the purpose of draining the site at a faster
rate than the existing ditch; and (3) place the
material dredged for the ditch on top of the
existing fill.
The Corps issued public notice of the
application for a permit and reviewed and
responded to letters from those concerned
with Slagle's development. After a twenty
day public review period, the Corps denied
Slagle's application. The Corps concluded
that the issuance of a fill permit would be
contrary to the public interest and that resto-
ration was needed to restore the areas al-
ready adversely impacted through the unau-
thorized placement of fill material. The Corps
ordered Slagle to restore the wetland to its
previous condition.
Slagle filed suit, claiming that (1) the Corps
was without jurisdiction to regulate his prop-
erty, (2) the Corps was estopped from claim-
ing jurisdiction because it failed to respond to
public notice issued in conjunction with his
Cass County permit application, (3) the Corps
was estopped from claiming jurisdiction be-
cause he relied on the Corps' maps indicat-
ing where the navigable waters are located,
(4) the Corps deprived him of all economi-
cally beneficial uses of the property constitut-
ing a 5th Amendment taking, and (5) the
Corps violated the Administrative Procedure
Act. Slagle sought injunctive relief, enjoining
the Corps from enforcing its restoration
order.
Jurisdiction. The court, referring to the
Supreme Court's recognition of Congress'
intent to give "waters of the United States"
the broadest possible meaning, concluded
that adjacent wetlands may be defined as
waters under the Clean Water Act ("CWA").
The court specifically concluded that Slagle's
wetland was adjacent to a lake which was a
tributary of waters used in interstate com-
merce in that it was hydrologically connected
to a river which fed into a second lake, from
which a second river emptied into the Missis-
sippi River.
The court further concluded that the Corps
was not estopped from asserting jurisdiction
by publishing maps of navigable waters nor
by failing to respond to public notices in
conjunction with the Cass County permit
applications. To prove estoppel against the
government, it must be shown that there was
affirmative misconduct by an agent of the
United States upon which the other party
reasonably relied to his detriment. Slagle
could not have reasonably relied on the
Corps' maps because the maps contained
the notation 'All Other Waters and Wetlands
Not Shown on This Map Should Be Consid-
ered To Be Covered By Section 404 of the
1972 Act." Additionally. the Corps was not
under any legal duty to attend every public
hearing, or respond to every public notice
concerning matters within its jurisdiction.
Taking. The court also denied Slagle's claim
that the Corps' actions constituted a 5th
Amendment taking of his property. The
court pointed out that Slagle's assertion of a
5th Amendment taking as a defense to
jurisdiction was improper and that the proper
action required Slagle to initiate a suit for
compensation in the Claims Court.
Administrative Procedure Act. The court
set forth the general rule that the APA allows
courts to set aside agency actions, findings,
and conclusion if found to be "arbitrary,
capricious, and an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with law..... 5
U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). The court further noted
that it should give deference to the agency's
determination and may not substitute its
judgment for that of the agency, but must
look only to whether the agency has consid-
ered the relevant factors or made a clear
error of judgment.
The court concluded that the Corps de-
nial of Slagle's permit was not arbitrary and
capricious in that the Corps made findings
with respect to noise levels, aesthetic values,
recreation, transportation, public health,
safety, community growth, land use, prop-
erty values, public facilities, employment,
business activity, flooding, energy, mineral
needs, air quality, terrestrial habitat, aquatic
habitat, water quality, and water supply.
Furthermore, because Slagle's proposed resi-
dential development was not strictly watei
dependent, practicable altematives are pre-
sumed to be available and Slagle failed tc
demonstrate that alternatives were not avail
able.
- Brian S. Franciskatc
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BANKRUPTCY COURT
In re Campbell Sixty Six Express v.
Central Transport, 147 B.R. 200
(Bankr.W.D.Mo. 1992).
Campbell 66 took Chapter 11. After con-
firmation of their plan they sold a trucking
terminal in Irving, Texas, to Central Trans-
port. The sale price was $1.3 million dollars.
As part of the sale, Campbell 66 placed
$475,000 of the sale price in escrow to pay
for any necessary environmental cleanup at
the terminal. Great Southern Savings Bank
had a validly perfected lien on the property
and retained a lien on the sale proceeds.
After the cleanup was virtually
completed, Campbell 66 argued
that it was unnecessary to
keep the remaining
$290,000 in escrow, as the
only remaining task was an
inexpensive monitoring pro-
cedure. Central said the full
amount should be kept in
escrow, since the exact cost
of the remaining cleanup was
unknown.
Noting that the estimated
costs of the remaining
cleanup and monitoring were
just $5,000, the bankruptcy judge or-
dered all but $20,000 of the escrowed funds
to be released, with the monies being paid to
Campbell 66 and Great Southern to reduce
Campbell's indebtedness.
Interco, Inc. v. Converse, Inc., 146
B.R. 447 (Bankr.E.D.Mo. 1992)
General Electric Company ("Claimant")
filed a motion requesting that the court order
that a deposition of Goldberg-Zoino and
Associates, Inc. ("GZA"), an environmental
consulting firm, not take place. Claimant
also requested the court to order the Debtor,
seeking to depose GZA, to pay Claimant's
reasonable fees and expenses in connection
with the motion. It requested, in the altema-
tive. that the Debtor be ordered to pay GZA
for its time in preparing for and giving its
deposition and to pay Claimant one half of
the fees paid by Claimant to obtain facts and
opinions of GZA on the matter.
Claimant had hired GZA to perform a
preliminary site investigation of a contami-
nated site Claimant had leased to Debtor.
Debtor asserted that GZA had been em-
ployed to perform the preliminary investiga-
tion as part of a response action in compli-
ance with the Massachusetts Superfund Act
and its implementing regulations, the Massa-
chusetts Contingency Plan. Claimant, how-
ever, contends that it hired GZA in anticipa-
tion of litigation with debtor overpaying the
cleanup costs of the contamination.
The primary issue before the
ditions at the site which "certainly have
undergone some changes since GZA's re-
port," making it "impracticable, if not impos-
sible for Debtor's expert to recreate those
conditions." Debtor then was permitted by
the court to depose GZA as to those physical
conditions observed or tested by GZA.
The court held that, pursuant to
Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(bX4XA,B,C), Debtor must
pay GZA a reasonable fee incurred in re-
sponding to discovery, as well as pay Claim-
ant a "fair portion of the fees and expenses
reasonably incurred by Claimant in obtaining
facts and opinions from GZA." The court,
however, deferred ruling on those amounts
until the conclusion of the deposition.




court was whether Debtor was entitled to
depose GZA when GZA was not expected to
testify and when Claimant made available a
copy of the reports issued by GZA, in addi-
tion to the report issued by the testifying
expert. Also in issue was whether Debtor
must pay Claimant reasonable fees for time
spent responding to discovery, as well as a
fair portion of Claimant's fees in obtaining
the expert's (GZA) opinions.
The court held that Debtor was entitled to
depose GZA as to data and methodology
relied upon by Claimant's testifying expert
since such information was not available
from the reports or other sources, thus
finding the existence of "exceptional circum-
stances" under Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(4)(B). The
court also found that the testifying expert of
Claimant made its findings in reliance on he
methodology developed by GZA under con-
Farmland Indus., Inc. v. Morrison-
Quirk Grain Corp., 987 F.2d 1335(8th
b6Cr. 1993)
The FAR-MOR-CO Site
.... mn***" near Hastings, Nebraska was
placed on the National Priorities
List by the Environmental Protection
Agency ("EPA") in 1986. It was desig-
nated as a Superfund site due to soil and
groundwater contamination found at the
Site. The EPA brought a CERCLA action for
response costs against Morrison Enterprises
("Morrison"). The district court found that
Morrison owned the Site at the time of
release, and thus, was a responsible party
under CERCLA. The court noted that its
holding was not based on a determination
that Morrison had caused the contamination
at the site.
Farmland Industries ("Farmland") had pur-
chased the Site from Morrison in 1975,
which had owned the property since 1954.
Farmland brought a declaratory judgment
action against Morrison, seeking a ruling that
Morrison would be liable for any response
costs incurred by Farmland. Morrison filed a
counterclaim against Farmland seeking con-
tribution and indemnity for costs incurred in





While Morrison owned the Site, it oper-
ated a grain storage and handling business in
which it used chemicals containing carbon
tetrachloride and ethylene dibromide; haz-
ardous substances as defined by 42 U.S.C.
§ 9601(14). In 1959 an explosion occurred
at the Site and 940 gallons of the chemicals
were lost. At the time Farmland acquired the
Site there were still 2500 gallons of the
chemicals in a storage tank. Some time
between 1982 and 1983, Farmland discov-
ered that the tank was empty.
A jury found for Morrison on Farmland's
claim and for Farmland on Morrison's coun-
terclaim. The district court denied both par-
ties' motions for judgment notwithstanding
the verdict or, in the altemative, a new trial.
The parties appealed.
Farmland contended that Morrison should
be liable for all response costs because the
court had found it to be a responsible party
in the previous case and the court therefore
should have applied collateral estoppel. The
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals found that
the district court properly refused to give
collateral estoppel effect to the prior case
because Farmland failed to meet its burden in
proving that collateral estoppel should be
applied given that causation was not decided
in the previous case and that causation was
an essential elementary of Farmland's claim.
With respect to Morrison's counterclaim,
the Court of Appeals found that because the
district court's jury instructions regarding
causation, the nature of CERCLA liability,
and the standards for liability to the govem-
ment and to third parties were confusing
They could have resulted in prejudice to
Morrison. Accordingly, the court of appeals
reversed and remanded for a new trial.
- Pamela J. Johnson
City of Ames, Iowa v. Reil
253 (8th Cir. 1993)
The City of Ames, Iowa rec
National Pollutant Discharge
System ("NPDES") permit in
from the State of Iowa, which th
it for EPA approval pursuant t
Clean Water Act ("Act"). The E
to the permit as inconsistent wit
failing to comply with Iowa's am
gen discharge standards. The
informed the EPA it would no
permit. The EPA held an eviden
concerning its objections.
The City of Ames filed a peti
8th Circuit Court of Appeals for
EPA's veto of the permit.
By a regulation promulgated
the Act, the EPA Regional Ad
required to announce whether t
will be continued, withdrawn
Because the Regional Administ
announced such a decision, th
the petition for review was pre
court lacked jurisdiction until t
Administrator makes a decisio
Waste Sys. Corp. v. Count
985 F.2d 1381 (8th Cir. 1993
Martin and Faribault Coun
ties") appealed from an order
States District Court for Minnes
ordinances enacted by the Cou
ing that all compostable was
within the Counties be delivered
ties' solid waste composting fac
Before the Plant was con
proximately two-thirds of the
generated by the Counties wa
to a landfill located across st
operated by Waste Systems Co
Plant was in its planning stages
prepared plans which conside
tion of ordinances that would
ly, 86 F.2d all compostable solid waste generated within
the Counties be sent to the Plant. The need
for such ordinances centered upon eco-
eived a new nomic reasons, and would require the desig-
Elimination nation for its financial support both initially
early 1993 and for continued operation. The Counties
en submitted also considered whether methods less re-
o the federal strictive than designation could ensure the
PA objected economic stability of the Plant and con-
h the Act by cluded that they could not.
monia nitro- Designation ordinances were approved
State then by the Counties with a two part exemption
t amend the which stated that the county "shall grant the
tiary hearing [exemption] petition if it determines that: a)
the materials will in fact be processed ... and
tion with the b) the inclusion can be implemented with-
review of the out impairing the financial viability of
the Facility ...
pursuant to The district court found that the ordi-
ninistrator is nances discriminated against interstate com-
he objections merce and were enacted as protectionist
or changed. measures. Based upon this finding, the court
rator had not granted Waste Systems' motion for sum-
e court held mary judgment and permanently enjoined
nature as the enforcement of the ordinances.
he Regional On appeal, the Eighth Circuit Court of
n. Appeals noted that the crucial determination
- Tom Ray is whether the ordinance is "basically a pro-
tectionist measure or whether it can be
viewed as a law directed to legitimate local
; of Martin, concerns, with effects upon interstate com-
merce that are only incidental." Unlike othei
cases concerning the interstate movement oi
ties ("Coun- solid waste, this case prohibits the exporta-
of the United tion rather than the importation of solic
ota enjoining waste. The court noted that this difference i
nties mandat- merely superficial and that regulations thai
te generated restrict the transportation of waste out of
to the Coun- state also are subject to the limitations of the
ility ("Plant"). Commerce Clause.
structed, ap- The Counties argued that the ordinance.
solid waste are evenhanded because of the availability o
s transported the exemption. The court found the provi
ate lines and sion illusory because the likelihood that
rp. While the facility could apply successfully for an ex
the Counties emption was virtually nonexistent given tha
red the adop- there are no other facilities within haulin(
designate that distance of the Plant and the price of con
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struction is astronomical.
The court also found that the ordinances
had a substantial effect on interstate com-
merce despite the fact that the residents of
the Counties were paying for the Plant be-
cause the ordinances removed the
compostable solid waste from the interstate
market. By mandating that all compostable
solid waste be delivered to the Plant, the
ordinances insulated the Plant from compe-
tition with cheaper waste facilities. There-
fore, the court characterized the ordinances
as protectionist.
Finally, the court noted that regulations
enacted for health and safety reasons which
affect interstate commerce can be justified.
While the purpose for the Plant may have
included legitimate environmental concerns,
however, the purposes behind these ordi-
nances are purely economic.
Tioga Public Sch. Dist. # 15 v. U.S.
Gypsum Co., 984 F.2d 915 (8th Cir.
1993).
The Tioga School District ("Tioga") sued
U.S. Gypsum ("USG"), the manufacturer of
an acoustical plaster containing asbestos.
Tioga used the plaster during school con-
struction projects in the late 1950's and early
1960's. The lawsuit sought to recover the
relatively low costs of encapsulating the plas-
ter to prevent the release of friable asbestos
fibers, as well as the much larger sums
needed to remove the asbestos. Tioga brought
suit in North Dakota state court; USG re-
moved to federal court.
The jury returned a general verdict in favor
of Tioga and awarded more than $825,000
in compensatory and punitive damages. Af-
ter the court denied USG's motion for JNOV
or for a new trial, USG appealed.
USG cited five errors by the district court,
the most telling being the submission of
Tioga's nuisance claim to the jury. USG also
claimed error in the court's rejection of the
argument that compliance with Government
Services Administration specifications in ef-
fect at the time of the school construction
constituted a state-of-the-art defense. Other
issues on appeal involved the propriety of
the jury charges on punitive damages and
implied warranty claims and allowing Tioga
to recover in tort for purely economic loss.
The Eighth Circuit remanded for a new trial
on the ground that the case should not have
been submitted on a claim of nuisance.
North Dakota recognizes both a common
law and a statutory action for nuisance.
Tioga's nuisance claim was based on the
state statute which proscribes an act or
omission which "annoys, injures, or endan-
gers the comfort, repose, health, or safety of
others," or which "in any way renders other
persons insecure in life or in the use of
property." N.D.Cent.Code § 42-01-01.
The Eighth Circuit first decided that com-
mon law nuisance would not lie in an action
against an asbestos manufacturer under the
facts of this case. It then noted that North
Dakota's hundred-year-old statutory action
appears limited to the classic context of a
landowner conducting an activity which in-
terferes with the rights of her neighbors. It
cited North Dakota Supreme Court deci-
sions which held the statutory provision is in
concordance with the common law.
Therefore, the court of appeals ruled this
case could not have been submitted on a
nuisance claim. Since the jury's general ver-
dict left no room for interpretation, the court
remanded for a new trial.
Southeast Ark. Landfill, Inc. v. Ar-
kansas, 981 F.2d 372 (8th Cir. 1992)
Southeast Arkansas Landfill, Inc. brought
this action against Arkansas Department of
Pollution Control & Ecology ("PC & E")
seeking an injunction to prevent PC & E
from enforcing Arkansas statutes restricting
the importation of solid waste. The U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of
Arkansas denied Southeast Arkansas
Landfill's request for an injunction. South-
east Arkansas Landfill appealed challenging
the validity of Acts 870 and 319 of the
Arkansas General Assembly under the Com-
merce Clause.
Act 870 establishes a planning and man-
agement process for solid waste on a re-
gional basis. Act 870 divides the state into
eight regions, each to be managed by a
Regional Solid Waste Planning Board. As
originally passed, the statute prohibited land-
fills for two years from accepting solid waste
from outside the boundaries of the Solid
Waste Planning District in which they are
located. An exception to the ban provided
that landfills already serving areas outside
their districts could continue to do so, but the
total amount of waste received from outside
the district may not exceed twenty percent of
the total solid waste received at the landfill.
Act 319 provides that the restrictions shall
apply until the later of a specified date or until
the landfills in both the districts and the state
reach a ten year capacity.
The State argued that the statutes do not
discriminate against out-of-state waste and
that they operate even-handedly between in-
state and out-of-state waste. Waste that comes
from within the state, but outside a given
district is treated the same as out-of-state
waste.
The State also argued that the statutes
should be upheld because they were an
attempt to comply with Federal policy as
expressed in the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901,
et seq. ("RCRA"). RCRA mandates a system
of regional planning by the states; Acts 870
and 319 were responses to that mandate.
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held
that the Supreme Court's decision in Fort
Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan
Dept. of Natural Resources, U.S._,
112 S.Ct. 2019 (1992) compelled a reversal
of this case. The Court in Fort Gratiot held
that states may not indirectly restrict inter-
state commerce through political subdivi-
sions of the state. The court noted however,
that both acts contained severability clauses
and did not require the invalidation of the
sections of the acts that did not discriminate
against out-of-state waste.
United States v. Mexico Feed and
Seed Co., 980 F.2d 478 (8th Cir. 1992)
In the mid-1960's, Pierce Waste Oil Ser-
vice, Inc. ("PWOS"), a waste oil hauling
company, leased a small plot of land near
Mexico, Missouri, from its owner, James
Covington, and his business. Mexico Feed
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and Seed. PWOS used the site as a storage
and transfer facility through 1976, at which
time it stopped using tanks on the property
and allowed them to fall into disrepair. The
tanks began to leak and fill with rainwater,
and oil residue oozed from them. In 1983,
the assets of PWOS were sold to Moreco
Energy, Inc., a pre-existing corporation in
the re-refining business. To avoid buying any
hidden liabilities, Moreco had the owner of
PWOS, Jack Pierce, compile an asset list.
The asset list did not include the Mexico tank
storage site, but in an attempt to insure the
sale included goodwill and other intangibles,
the list included a statement that it was not
exclusive. Moreco never knew of the storage
tanks.
In 1985, the EPA inspected the tanks and
discovered PCB's and a ring of PCB con-
tamination around the tanks extending for
about 100 feet in all directions. Such a ring
indicated the initial contamination occurred
about 20 years earlier. After cleanup, EPA
brought suit under CERCLA to recover costs,
suing the land owners, Pierce, PWOS, and
Moreco. The EPA claimed Moreco was li-
able as the successor corporation to PWOS.
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals first
focused on PWOS' argument that it did not
own or operate the tanks at the time of
contamination. The evidence clearly showed
that PWOS hauled waste oil from several
clients who generated PCB-contaminated
oil, that the oil was stored in the tanks, that
PWOS was the exclusive user of the storage
facility, and that the tanks and surrounding
area were contaminated with high concen-
trations of PCBs. Pierce, who was the presi-
dent of the company and an active manager,
was held to be a responsible party under
CERCLA. While Pierce and PWOS argued
they were ignorant of PCB contamination,
the court said even if that were true, it is
irrelevant under CERCLA's strict liability
standard.
The Eighth Circuit then turned to Moreco's
liability, noting that the issue depended on a
three-part analysis: whether corporate suc-
cessors are covered persons under CERCLA;
what elements establish a "corporate succes-
sor;" and whether Moreco meets the test of
"corporate successor" under the facts of this
case.
Looking at the intent of Congress and the
language of CERCLA the court held that
corporate successors are covered persons
under the statute. The definition of "person"
in CERCLA contains the words "corpora-
tion land] association." The general Code
definitions of "company" and "association."
found at 1 U.S.C. § 5, indicate that when
used in referring to a corporation these terms
include successors and assigns. By infer-
ence, therefore, the court found that a suc-
cessor corporation is a "covered person" for
the purposes of CERCLA.
The purpose of successor corporation
liability is to prevent corporations from evad-
ing their liabilities by changing ownership.
While asset purchasers generally are not
liable for the wrongs of asset sellers, courts
have extended liability to them so corpora-
tions cannot escape debt through transac-
tional technicalities. The asset purchaser will
be considered a corporate successor when:
(1) the purchaser expressly or impliedly as-
sumes the liability; (2) the transaction is a "de
facto" merger or consolidation; (3) the pur-
chaser is merely a continuation of the seller
corporation; or (4) the transaction was a
sham entered into to escape liability.
The third element, "mere continuation,"
was modified by the district court, which
found Moreco liable under a theory of "sub-
stantial continuation." While "mere continu-
ation" presupposes an enduring sameness
of officers, directors, or stockholders, "sub-
stantial continuation" allows liability to fol-
low the assets whenever the purchaser knows
of pending wrongs committed by the selling
corporation. After analyzing the cases which
have applied "substantial continuity" in other
contexts, the Eighth Circuit said the applica-
tion of any test which would hold an asset
purchaser liable must further CERCLA's
essential purpose of making responsible
parties pay.
Because Moreco purchased without no-
tice of the storage tanks, the Eighth Circuit
held it did not meet the "substantial continu-
ation" test. The court noted that the EPA had
dismissed Moreco from an earlier proceed-
ing under the Toxic Substances Control Act,
15 U.S.C. § 2605 (e), because "Moreco
never knew of or purchased" the storage
tanks in question.
- Chuck McPheeters
Friends of the Boundary Waters Wil-
derness v. Robertson. 978 F.2d 1484
(8th Cir. 1993)
This action was brought by several non-
profit organizations seeking to prohibit the
use of motorized transportation of boats
across portages in the Boundary Waters
Canoe Area. The Boundary Waters Canoe
Wilderness Area Act ("Act") provides that
the use of motorized transportation shall be
terminated January 1, 1994, unless the
Forest Service determines there is no fea-
sible non-motorized means of transporting
boats across the portages. The United States
Forest Service allowed the use of motorized
transport because no "feasible" alternative
existed.
The district court upheld the Forest
Service's determination that no feasible al-
ternative was available and held that the term
"feasible" within the meaning of the Act
meant "reasonably possible" or "practicable,"
and not "physically possible." 770 F.Supp.
1385 (D. Minn. 1991).
Reversing the lower court, the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals noted that one of
the purposes of the Act is to "restore natural
conditions to existing temporary roads in the
wilderness." The court concluded that pro-
hibiting motorized transport between por-
tages is consistent with the Act unless it is not
physically possible to accomplish the same
end by non-motorized means. Based upon a
study by the Service in which 26 out of 34
attempts were unsuccessful in crossing the
portages without motorized assistance, the
court found that it was physically possible to
cross the portages without motorized trans-
port, and therefore, according to the Act,
motorized transport must be prohibited.
- Tim Bickham
Audubon Soc'y of Central Arkansas
v. Dailey, 977 F.2d 428 (8th Cir. 1992)
The voters in Little Rock, Arkansas ap-
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proved a capital improvement bond issue to
improve streets. Pursuant to § 10 of the
Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of
1899, 33 U.S.C. § 403, and § 404 of the
Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1344, (1988),
the City submitted an application to the
United States Army Corps of Engineers
("Corps") for a permit to put fill in along a
creek for a new proposed road that was to be
extended through Rebsamen Park.
Under the National Environmental Policy
Act ("NEPA"), federal agencies must pre-
pare an Environmental Impact Statement
("EIS") before approving major federal ac-
tions significantly affecting the quality of the
human environment. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2XC)
(1988). In determining whether an EIS was
necessary for this project, the Corps decided
that NEPA required the Corps to consider
the environmental impact on the entire area
of the proposed road extension plus the
existing Rebsamen Park Road from gateway
to gateway by conducting an Environmental
Assessment ("EA"). In connection with its
review, the Corps gave notice to various
state and federal agencies and gave public
notice of the permit application. The Corps
received responses from the Transportation
Department, the Corps' resident engineer,
and the Mayor of Little Rock. All of the
responses included various projections of
how the new road would increase traffic in
the Park because individuals commuting to
downtown would use the new road rather
than the old road.
The Corps then hired consulting engi-
neers to study the effect of the road exten-
sion. The engineers issued a report conclud-
ing that the traffic volumes anticipated by the
City would pose a threat to the recreational
use of the areas along the Arkansas River.
The engineers made some remedial sugges-
tions, including: separate bridges over the
creek, one for automobiles and another for
bicycles and pedestrians: and "curvilinear
alignment" and use of stop signs on Rebsamen
Park Road. The City rejected the proposal.
Because of the unresolved opposition, the
Corps held a public hearing on the permit
application. Those in favor of the proposed
road were primarily people from nearby
neighborhoods who saw the proposal as a
way to relieve their own streets of excessive
traffic. Those opposed to the new road were
concerned about the increase in commuter
traffic into the park, which would ruin the
recreational value of the park. Additionally,
they were concerned with the risks to bicycle
riders, joggers and pedestrians. They argued
that the City did not enforce the posted 45
mph speed limit on the present road and that
motorists drove as fast as 60 mph.
In its final draft of the EA, the Corps
concluded that the proposed road would
have "no significant impact on the quality of
the human environment." Therefore, it
found no need to prepare an EIS and granted
the permit. The Audubon Society and sev-
eral others sued the City and the Corps to
enjoin the project. The district court re-
viewed the Corps' decision under the "arbi-
trary and capricious" standard of review and
concluded that the traffic problem resulting
from the project would "significantly affect
the quality of the human environment" and
that the Corps was required to prepare an
EIS. The court entered an order suspending
the grant of the permit and enjoining con-
struction until an EIS was completed. The
City appealed the district court's order, argu-
ing that the Corps considered the effect of
the traffic and that the court cannot require
the Corps to do anything further.
Standard of Review
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held
that the arbitrary and capricious standard,
rather than a de novo standard, applied to
the review of the decision by the Corps that
a bridge over the creek would not signifi-
cantly affect the quality of the environment
because the Corps' determination involved
mixed questions of fact and law. Under the
arbitrary and capricious standard, the re-
viewing court is limited to determining
whether the Corps considered relevant fac-
tors in concluding that an EIS was not
required for a bridge over the creek. The
court of appeals must reverse if there has
been a "clear error of judgment." Under this
standard, the court has the responsibility to
verify that the agency's conclusion follows
from the premises the agency relies on.
Corps' Decision
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals noted
there is no dispute that if the road extension
were made without special regulation of its
use, the effect would be a large increase in
traffic causing a significant impact on the
quality of the human environment. The Corps
concluded that due to the City's traffic con-
trol measures, however, the adverse impact
on the environment would be minimized.
Based on the evidence, however, the Eighth
Circuit ruled the Corps acted arbitrarily in
determining that the project would have no
significant impact on the human environ-
ment.
An agency may certainly make its decision
of "no significant impact" on mitigating mea-
sures to be undertaken by third parties;
however, the mitigating measures must be
"more than mere vague statements of good
intentions." In this case, the evidence gave
every indication that the City would not and
could not enforce the speed limit on the new
extension. Furthermore, even at the 35 mph
speed limit, an estimated traffic volume of
8,000 to 9,000 vehicles per day ("vpd")
would have an adverse effect on park users.
Even with 7,550 vpd, the vehicles would not
be able to get on and off the road safely and
many people would be discouraged from
using the recreational facilities. Based on this
evidence, the court of appeals concluded
that the judgment of the district court requir-
ing an EIS was not in error.
- Brian S. Franciskato
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